Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 21

Number 4

Article 4

8-1-1999

Cohiba: Not Just Another Name, Not Just Another Stogie: Does
General Cigar Own a Valid Trademark for the Name Cohiba in the
United States
Mark D. Nielsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark D. Nielsen, Cohiba: Not Just Another Name, Not Just Another Stogie: Does General Cigar Own a
Valid Trademark for the Name Cohiba in the United States, 21 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 633 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol21/iss4/4

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

COHIBA: NOT JUST ANOTHER NAME, NOT JUST ANOTHER STOGIE:
DOES GENERAL CIGAR OWN A VALID TRADEMARK FOR THE
NAME "COHIBA" IN THE UNITED STATES?
I. INTRODUCTION

Cuban Cohiba cigars are widely regarded as the world's finest
cigars. Crafted from the "selection of the selection" of Cuba's
tobacco,1 cigar aficionados 2 clamor for the opportunity to enjoy
Cohibas. Cohiba cigars are not, and have never been, legally
available in the United States because the economic embargo
against Cuba 3 took effect prior to the creation of Cohiba by
Avelino Lara in 1968. 4 In 1978, Culbro, a U.S. corporation, filed a
trademark application for the name Cohiba in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).5 At the same time, Culbro
began limited marketing and sales 6 of Cohiba cigars made from
Dominican Republic tobacco. 7 Because of the embargo, Cuba did
not register the Cohiba name in the United States, nor did it
oppose Culbro's registration of Cohiba in 1978.8 At present,
Culbro owns the rights to the Cohiba name in the United States.

1. James Suckling, The Legend of Cohiba-Cigar Lovers Everywhere Dream of
Cuba's Finest Cigar, CIGAR AFICIONADO, Autumn 1992, at 42 (quoting Cohiba's creator,
Avelino Lara).
2. A cigar "aficionado" is a connoisseur or "enthusiast" of fine cigars; see
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 36 (1986).

3. See Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962) (initiating the economic
embargo against Cuba).
4. See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42; see also Larry Rohter, Castro's Cigar, A
Namesake, and the Smell of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1997, at A4.
5. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Mktg., 988 F. Supp. 647, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
6. See id. at 651-2.
7. See id. at 652.
8. See Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Files Rum and Cigar Trademark Challenges in U.S.,
MIAMI HERALD, May 15, 1997, at A24.
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In recent years, there have been questions raised concerning
the continuing enforcement of the embargo against Cuba. 9 This
potential change in circumstances prompted Cuba's government
tobacco company to seek cancellation1 ° of General Cigar's
(Culbro's assignee)" Cohiba trademark in the United States.
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco (hereinafter Cubatabaco) asserts that
General Cigar willfully committed acts of trademark infringement
and trademark dilution regarding the Cohiba name. 12 In addition,
Cubatabaco claims that Culbro/General Cigar's use of the Cohiba
name violates the provisions of several international treaties to
which both the United States and Cuba are parties. 13 This
Comment discusses the merits of Cubatabaco's trademark
infringement and dilution claims, as well as its treaty claims, in its
pending action in the Southern District of New York to cancel
Part II provides
Culbro/General Cigar's Cohiba trademark.
background into the development of Cohiba cigars both in Cuba
and by Culbro/General Cigar and highlights the basis for the
current dispute. Part III discusses the applicable trademark laws,
including the Lanham Act, 14 New York State Trademark Dilution
Law, 15 the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (hereinafter Paris Convention), 16 and the General InterAmerican Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection
(hereinafter Pan American Convention). 17 Part IV discusses the

9. See G.A. Res. 53/4, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/5314, at 1 (1998)
(the most recent of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions voting that the United States
should end its embargo against Cuba); see also S. 1413, 105th Cong. (1997); Anthony
Goodman, U.S. Urged by Record U.N. Vote to End Cuba Embargo, CUBANET NEWS, (last
modified Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.netpoint.net/-cubanetlCnews/y97/nov97/ 06e4.htm>
(U.N. vote virtually unanimous).
10. See Complaint at para. 1, Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97
Civ. 8399 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Complaint].
11. See General Cigar, 988 F. Supp. at 652. Culbro assigned the Cohiba trademark to
its subsidiary, General Cigar, in 1987. See id.
12. See Complaint at para. 1. The Complaint alleges thirteen different claims for
relief. This Comment only discusses the several mentioned in the text (the infringement,
dilution, and treaty claims). See generally id.
13. See id. at paras. 42-45, 49-52.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
15. N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 360-1 (McKinney 1999).
16. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 6bis,
21 U.S.T. 1629, 1640 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
17. General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
Feb. 20, 1929, arts. 7,8,46 Stat. 2907 [hereinafter Pan American Convention].
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application of the laws, as well as possible outcomes of the pending
litigation. Part V concludes that Cubatabaco should prevail on its
treaty claims, whereas much closer questions exist regarding the
infringement and dilution claims.
II.

BACKGROUND: BASIS FOR THE PRESENT DISPUTE

Cohiba is the name of a brand of cigars created in Cuba
during the 1960s. 18 Cuban President, Fidel Castro, originally gave
Cohiba cigars as gifts to foreign dignitaries. 19 Quickly, Cohibas
became world-famous due to their superior quality. 20 In fact, the
21
Cuban Government takes great pride in the quality of its cigars.
22
Cohiba cigars are considered a national treasure.
In the early 1970s, Cubatabaco began selling Cohiba cigars in
diplomatic stores in Havana, where the majority of customers were
foreign diplomats, foreign journalists, and employees of foreign
companies. 23 Cubatabaco registered the Cohiba trademark in
Cuba in 1972.24
By the early 1980s, Cohiba cigars were
commercially available in many countries throughout the world. 25
Cubatabaco has registered the Cohiba name as a trademark in 115

18. See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42.
19. See A Conversationwith Fidel, CIGAR AFICIONADO, Summer 1994, at 55.
20. See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42 (discussing the Cuban Cohiba, Suckling writes,
"what was once considered the smoke of world leaders became the cigar of the world
cognoscenti. Today, its unique bright yellow, white and black band became a symbol of
success in much of the world.").
21. See A Conversation with Fidel, supra note 19, at 48. Castro indicated that he
considers cigars to be one of Cuba's most important exports and that the quality of its
cigars brings prestige to Cuba. See id.
22. See Inside Cuban Cigars, CIGAR AFICIONADO, Spring 1994, at 76. In an
interview, Francisco Padron, the Director of Cubatabaco said, "I have orders directly from
Fidel. He has said that I mustn't deliver cigars that are not the best quality. He says that
they represent the image of the best quality of Cuba. So we never do anything but deliver
the best quality." Id.
23. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of the Setting of a Date for a
Hearing on a Preliminary Injunction and for an Order of Expedited Discovery at 3,
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25,
1997) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law].
24. See id. at 4.
25. See Rohter, supra note 4, at A4. According to Rohter, representatives from
Cuba's tobacco marketing division, Habanos S.A., contend that Cohibas hit the market in
1981. See id.
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countries. 26 Cuban Cohibas have never been legally available in
the United States because the embargo banning trade with Cuba
went into effect in 1962, prior to the creation of Cohiba. 27 As
such, Cuba never registered the Cohiba name in the United States,
28
although it could have.
In 1978, Culbro filed a trademark application to register the
Cohiba name with the PTO. 29 At approximately the same time,
Culbro began marketing limited quantities of a Cohiba cigar made
in the Dominican Republic. 30 A set of notes from a December 12,
1977 Culbro meeting indicate that Culbro was aware that Cohiba
was the name of the personal brand of cigars that Fidel Castro
smoked. 31 In addition, a second set of notes dated December 14,
1977 state "COHIBA - sell in Cuba - brand in Cuba - Castro's
brand cigars." 32 These notes provide evidence that Culbro knew,
prior to their Cohiba trademark application, that Cohiba was a
Cuban cigar brand. Culbro decided, however, to utilize the name
on its own product. 33 In fact, in 1994, Edgar Cullman, Sr., the
Chairman of Culbro, acknowledged that if trade with34 Cuba
opened, Culbro "want[ed] to have a position with Cohiba."
In 1981, the PTO approved Culbro's Cohiba trademark
application. 35 In 1987, Culbro assigned the Cohiba trademark to
its subsidiary, General Cigar. 36
General Cigar ceased
manufacturing Cohiba between 1988 and 1991, due to waning
interest in cigars. 37 Because of the cigar craze during the 1990s,

26. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 4.
27. See Proclamation No. 3447,27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
28. See Thomas V. Mulrine, Intellectual Property Court Watch-Trademark/Rights of
Non-Party, 4 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 10 (1998). See also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1126 (e) (1994); Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 8-9. The United States, by virtue of its
treaty obligations to Cuba, permits registration of trademarks by Cuban entities and
refuses to cancel such registered trademarks for nonuse because of the embargo; see
discussion infra Part III.
29. See General Cigar Co. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp. 647, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
30. See id. at 652.
31. See id. at 651.
32. Id. at 661.
33. See id. at 651,661.
34. Interview with Edgar Cullman, Sr., CIGAR AFICIONADO, Autumn 1994, at 66.
35. See General Cigar, 988 F. Supp. at 652.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 653.
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however, General Cigar relaunched the Cohiba cigar and
reapplied for a Cohiba trademark in the United States in 1992.38
39
The PTO granted the trademark in 1995.
At present, the Cuban Government cannot sell Cohiba cigars
in the United States because of the continuing enforcement of the
economic embargo against Cuba. 40 There is strong sentiment
among some commentators, however, urging the U.S. Government
to terminate the embargo. 41 In each of the last seven years, the
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution requesting
termination of the United States' economic embargo against
Cuba. 42 In fact, in 1997, the vote on the resolution was virtually
unanimous. 43
Furthermore, Senator Richard Lugar (Iowa)
introduced a bill in the Senate calling for substantial reform of
U.S. policy on unilateral economic sanctions. 44 Hence, the United
States may soon reconsider the continued enforcement of the
Cuban embargo. If the embargo is lifted, Cuban cigars will,
theoretically, be available in the United States. Because General
Cigar owns the Cohiba name in the United States, however,
Cuban Cohibas will not be available unless Cubatabaco and
General Cigar establish a licensing agreement. Based on the pride
that the Cuban Government takes in its Cohiba cigars, such an
agreement is not likely to occur.
Witnessing world sentiment in its favor, as well as the fiveyear deadline for a trademark cancellation action under § 1064 (1)
of the Lanham Act, 45 the Cuban Government is on the offensive
regarding the Cohiba trademark in the United States. In 1997,
Cubatabaco filed cancellation actions against General Cigar and

38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). See generally, Anthony M.
Solis, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 709 (1997); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act-Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
419,422 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Mario M. Cuomo, Helms-Burton Bill: A Sound Solution? U.S. Should
End Embargo Against Cuba Immediately, 215 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1996, at S1; see also, e.g.,
Lowenfeld, supra, note 40, at 422.
42. See G.A. Res. 53/4, supra note 9, at 1.
43. See Goodman, supra note 9.
44. See s. 1413, 105th Cong. (1997).
45. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(1) (1994) (allowing a party to petition for
cancellation of a registered trademark within five years of the trademark's registration).
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its Cohiba trademark in both federal court in the Southern District
of New York and the PTO. 4 6 Cubatabaco claims that General
Cigar committed trademark infringement by registering the
Cohiba name and selling Cohiba cigars in the United States. 47 In
addition, Cubatabaco asserts that Cohiba is a famous name and
that General Cigar's use of it constitutes trademark dilution,
violating both § 1125(c) of the Lanham Act 48 and New York State
Dilution Law. 49 Cubatabaco also states claims based on Article
6bis of the Paris Convention 50 and Articles 7 and 8 of the Pan
American Convention. 51
These are international treaties
concerning trademark registration to which both the United States
and Cuba are parties. 52 This Comment addresses the merits of
Cubatabaco's infringement, dilution, and treaty claims in its
lawsuit in the Southern District of New York.
III. TRADEMARK LAW
Cubatabaco relies on several sources of trademark law in its
lawsuit against General Cigar.53 First, Cubatabaco's trademark
54
infringement claim is governed by § 1125 (a) of the Lanham Act.
Second, for trademark dissolution claim, Cubatabaco relies, in
55
part, on Section 360-1 of the New York General Business Laws.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Complaint at para. 1.
See id.
See id.
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 360-1 (McKinney 1999).
Paris Convention, art. 6bis.
Pan American Convention, arts. 7, 8, 46 Stat. at 2907.
See Complaint at para. 1.
See id.
See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A). The Lanham Act provides that:
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods ...

,

uses in

commerce any word, term, name.... or any false designation of origin,
... which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, ... by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action

by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to damaged by
such act.
Id.
55. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 360-1 (McKinney 1999). This section provides that:
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark ... shall be a ground for injunctive relief
in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered ....
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Third, Cubatabaco relies on several international treaties to which
both the United States and Cuba are parties. These include the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property56 and
the Pan American Convention. 57 The following sections describe
the applicable sources of law upon which Cubatabaco relies. In
addition, these sections discuss relevant United States case law
addressing the various statutory provisions and treaties.
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act is the primary source of federal regulations
governing the registration and use of trademarks. 58 The Act
provides guidelines for the registration of trademarks, causes of
action for misuse, and remedies. Specific provisions relevant to
Cubatabaco's suit are discussed below. In terms of Cubatabaco's
cancellation action against General Cigar, § 1064 provides that a
party may petition to cancel the registration of a trademark if that
party believes it has been or will be damaged by defendant's
59
registration of that mark.
1. Trademark Infringement
Trademark infringement is a common type of injury in
trademark law. Trademark infringement occurs when one party
adopts a trademark that is the same or similar to an existing mark
such that the relevant purchasing public is likely to be confused,
mistaken, or misled as to the source of the product. 60 The Lanham
Act provides a cause of action for infringement 61 and a remedy of
injunctive relief.62 Monetary damages are usually unavailable
unless the infringing party intended to confuse or mislead the

notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the
absence of confusion as to the source of the goods....
Id.
56. See Paris Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 1629.
57. See Pan American Convention, 46 Stat. at 2907.
58. See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
59. See id. § 1064. The word "mark" is periodically used herein as a short form for
the word "trademark."
60. See Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial
Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121,122 (1996).

61. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A) (1994).
62. Seeid.§ 1116.
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public.
To state a prima facie case of trademark infringement under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
64
defendant's use of the trademark is likely to confuse consumers.
A likelihood of confusion exists where consumers believe that the
plaintiff sponsored or approved of the defendant's use of the
65
plaintiff's name.
First, to determine whether an infringement occurred, a court
must decide what degree of protection to afford the plaintiff's
trademark. 66 This determination depends on the "distinctiveness"
of the trademark. 67 Typically, trademarks are segregated into four
categories: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or
fanciful. 68 A generic mark simply defines a product and receives
no protection. 69 A descriptive mark describes a characteristic of a
product and receives narrow protection if the mark acquires a
secondary meaning. 70 A mark acquires secondary meaning when
the consumer associates the name of the product with its source,
71
rather than with the product itself.
A suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful mark is inherently
72
distinctive and is thus afforded the highest degree of protection.
A suggestive mark metaphorically alludes to a product 7 3 and

63. See id. § 1117 (b).
64. See North Am. Graphics, Inc. v. North Am. Graphics of U.S., Inc., No. 97 Civ.
3448, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8107, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1997).
65. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204-5 (2d Cir. 1979).
66. See North Am. Graphics,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8107 at *6.
67. See id. at *6-7 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4,9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
68. See id.
69. See id. See also Trademark Basics: A Guide for Business, International
Trademark Association (William M. Borchard, ed.) (last modified Dec. 23, 1998)
<http://www.inta.org/tmbasics.htm> [hereinafter Trademark Basics]. An example of a
generic trademark would be to refer to a brand of cigar as "Cigar." See id.
70. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir.
1976).
71. See Bristol Myers-Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir.
1992); see also Trademark Basics, supra note 69. An example of a descriptive mark that
acquired secondary meaning is "Rich n' Chips" for chocolate chip cookies. See Trademark
Basics, supra note 69.
72. See Abercrombie & Fitch,537 F.2d at 11.
73. See id.
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describes some attribute or benefit of a product. 74 An arbitrary or
no relation to a product and is essentially an
fanciful mark has
75
invented name.
Once a court determines the level of protection afforded to a
trademark, it will then assess the likelihood of consumer confusion
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks. 76 The factors
used to determine whether the public is likely to be confused by an
allegedly infringing trademark are described in PolaroidCorp. v.
PolaradElectronics Corp.77 The Polaroid factors include: 1) the
strength of the plaintiff's mark;78 2) the degree of similarity
between the two marks; 79 3) the competitive proximity of the two
marks; 80 4) the existence of actual confusion; 81 5) the likelihood
82
that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" between the two markets;

74. See Trademark Basics, supra note 69. An example of a suggestive mark is
"Coppertone." See id.
75. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12.
76. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,871 (2d Cir.
1986).
77. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Federal courts located in the Southern District
of New York, where Cubatabaco's lawsuit is pending, use these factors. See also General
Cigar Co. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp. 647,663 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
78. See General Cigar, 988 F. Supp. at 663 (quoting Lois Sportswear,799 F.2d at 873).
"The strength of the mark depends on its distinctiveness, or more precisely, 'its tendency
to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular source."' Id.
79. See W.W.W. Pharmaceutical v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1993). A
court, in considering whether the similarity between the marks will cause confusion among
potential purchasers, will look to the characteristics and appearance of the products and
logos themselves. See id.
80. See Lois Sportswear,799 F.2d at 874. This factor addresses whether plaintiff's and
defendant's products are available in similar markets. In fact, the court in Lois Sportswear
stated that, where the products are in separate markets, a greater likelihood of confusion
exists because it appears as though the plaintiff expanded into a distinct market. See id.
According to the Lois Sportswear court, "[wie are trying to determine if it is likely that
consumers mistakenly will assume that either appellants' jeans somehow are associated
with or made by appellee." Id. The court in Kookai S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F. Supp. 605, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), however, held that, where both plaintiff and defendant target the same
audience, there is a substantial likelihood of confusion based on this factor.
81. See Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 875. Actual confusion is not required to prevail
under the Lanham Act. Plaintiff need only show a likelihood of confusion. Actual
confusion is difficult to prove. If proven through surveys or reliable anecdotal evidence,
actual confusion is highly probative. See id.
82 See Kookai, 950 F. Supp. at 608. See also Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 874. A
court assesses the likelihood of whether the plaintiff will enter the defendant's market, or
the defendant will enter the plaintiff's market. In Lois Sportswear, the Second Circuit
Court stated that "if the owner of a trademark can show that it intends to enter the market
of the alleged infringer, that showing helps to establish a future likelihood of confusion as
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6) the defendant's good or bad faith in adopting the mark; 83 7) the
quality of defendant's product; 84 and 8) the sophistication of the
relevant purchasers. 85 No one of these factors is determinative. A
court balances these factors "in a non-mechanical way" to
determine the likelihood of consumer confusion. 86
If the
balancing of these factors indicates that an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent cigar consumers will likely be confused or
misled as to the source of General Cigar's Cohiba, Cubatabaco will
87
establish its prima facie case and be entitled to injunctive relief.
88

B. Trademark Dilution

New York State Law protects against dilution of distinctive
trademarks. 89 Dilution occurs when a trademark's ability to
identify a particular product diminishes over time. 90 Anti-dilution
statutes protect a trademark's selling power 91 and prevent the
"gradual whittling away of a firm's distinctive trade-mark or
name."92 There are two major categories of dilution: tarnishment
and blurring. 93 Tarnishment of a plaintiffs mark occurs when a
defendant uses a plaintiff's mark in association with inferior
products, obscenity, or illegal activity. 94 Blurring occurs where a
defendant uses or modifies a plaintiff's mark in such a way that the

to source." Lois Sportswear,799 F.2d at 874.
83. See Kookai, 950 F. Supp. at 608. Bad faith exists where a defendant uses
plaintiff's mark with the intent of capitalizing on plaintiff's reputation and consumer
goodwill, or simply where the defendant intends to confuse the public. See id.
84. See id. at 609. This factor focuses on whether the good reputation associated with
plaintiff's mark can be weakened by defendant's use of the same or similar mark on an
inferior product. See id.
85. See Id. Courts generally presume that more sophisticated purchasers are less
likely to be confused by similar marks. See id.
86. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d
Cir. 1993).
87. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 22 n.23.
88. Cubatabaco asserts dilution claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and N.Y. GEN.
Bus. § 360-1 (McKinney 1999).
89. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 360-1.
90. See Prager, supra note 60, at 123.
91. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621,624-5 (2d Cir. 1983).
92. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E. 2d 1162,
1166 (N.Y. 1977).
93. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204,209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
94. See id.
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mark no longer serves as a unique identifier of the plaintiff's
96
product. 95 In its lawsuit, Cubatabaco alleges dilution by blurring.
Therefore, this Comment only addresses blurring.
Pursuant to New York Law, a plaintiff must prove several
elements in order to prevail on a dilution by blurring claim. First,
the mark must be distinctive or famous and capable of being
diluted. 97 Second, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's use of
the trademark is likely to cause dilution. 98 Consumer confusion
about the source of the products or competition between the
products is not required. 99
To determine whether a mark is distinctive or famous, the
Second Circuit often looks to the strength of the mark element
The
from the Polaroid trademark infringement analysis. 100
list
of
factors
use
the
Southern District of New York may
1 1
enumerated in the Lanham Act's anti-dilution section.
Alternatively, courts may assess distinctiveness by determining
10 2
whether a mark acquired secondary meaning.
To assess the likelihood of dilution by blurring, the Second
Circuit uses the following factors: 10 3 1) the similarity between the
10 5
marks, 104 2) the similarity of the products covered by the marks,
3) the sophistication of the consumers, 10 6 4) predatory intent, 10 7 5)
95. See id.
96. See Complaint at para. 76.
97. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). An extremely strong mark capable of being
diluted is one that possesses inherent or acquired distinctiveness. See id. See also supra
Part III.A.I.
98. See Mead Data Central,875 F.2d. at 1030.
99. See id.
100. See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.
101. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B. E. Windows
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 210 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also infra, note 126 (a list of the
factors enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) to determine whether a mark is famous or
well known).
102. See Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d at 1030; see also Bristol Myers-Squibb Co. v.
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,1040 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. See Mead Data Central,875 F.2d at 1026 (Sweet, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 1035. There must be similarity between the marks for dilution to be
possible. Exact identity of the marks is not required. The greater the similarity between
the marks, however, the greater the likelihood of dilution. A lack of similarity may be
enough to defeat a dilution claim. See id.
105. See id. at 1036. The greater the similarity of the products, the greater the
likelihood of dilution. See id.
106. See id. at 1036-7. The greater the sophistication of the relevant consumers, the
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renown of the senior mark, 10 8 and 6) renown of the junior mark. 10 9
If the plaintiff establishes blurring, the court issues an injunction
preventing the defendant from using the mark.
C. InternationalConvention Provisions
Section 1126 (b) of the Lanham Act states that a party, whose
country of origin is a party to any treaty or convention relating to
trademarks to which the United States is also a party, is entitled to
the benefits of the Lanham Act to the extent necessary to give
effect to the provisions of such treaty or convention.110 This raises
the question of whether the provisions of the Paris Convention
and the Pan American Convention are currently in force in the
United States. The District Court in the Southern District of
n
Florida held that the Paris Convention is a self-executing treaty."
More importantly, the Second Circuit suggested that "no special
legislation was necessary to make the [Paris] Convention effective
•.. in the United States.11 2 Also, in 1940, the United States
Supreme Court, held that the Pan American Convention is selfexecuting.11 3 Therefore, the provisions of these treaties are in
114
force and applicable in the United States.
lower the possibility that defendant's use of the mark will reduce the distinctiveness of
plaintiff's mark. See id.
107. See id. at 1037. Predatory intent, if established, increases the likelihood of
dilution. Predatory intent requires more than knowledge of plaintiff's prior use of the
mark at issue. To establish predatory intent, plaintiff must prove that defendant adopted
the mark at issue and intended to benefit commercially from the association with
plaintiff's mark. See id.
108. See id. at 1038. The fame of plaintiff's mark effects consumer perception of both
the plaintiff's and defendant's products. The fame of plaintiff's mark, as it effects
consumer perception, directly bears upon the ability of defendant's mark to blur plaintiff's
mark. See id.
109. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows,
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "Where the fame of the junior mark is nonexistent, the likelihood of finding dilution by blurring is minimal." Id.
110. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (b) (1994).
111. See Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int'l, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 467
(S.D. Fla. 1983); see also Laborotorios Roldan, C. por A. v. Tex Int'l, Inc., 902 F. Supp.
1555, 1568 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
112. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co. Ltd., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956).
113. See Bacardi Corp. v. Domenich, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940). U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hughes stated that "[tihis treaty on ratification became a part of our law. No
special legislation in the United States was necessary to make it effective." Id.
114. See Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force, 376-77,
(1997).
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1. The Paris Convention
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention states that "Itihe
countries of the Union undertake ... at the request of an
interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to
prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction,
an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark
"115 The purpose of the
considered ...to be well known ...
Article is to provide protection against trademark pirates who
register trademarks in a particular country thereby preempting
foreign owners of well known marks from using their marks in that
particular country. 116 This is referred to as a "reputation without
use" scenario. 117 The exceptional protection afforded well known
marks is justified by the desire118to prevent unfair competition
through acts of trademark piracy.
The United States has no legislation to specifically afford
protection to well known marks that are not registered with the
PTO. 119 There is, however, United States case law holding that
well known marks, not registered in the United States, can be
protected. 120 Furthermore, the language of Article 6bis, 121 taken
together with the Article's underlying legislative intent, 122 suggests
that well known marks not registered in the United States should
be protected.
The law in the United States regarding reputation-withoutuse situations is unsettled. 123 Clearly, the mark at issue must be
well known in the United States; 124 but whether a mark is well
known depends upon a variety of factors. Virtually any evidence
probative of fame will be accepted. 125 Section 1125(c)(1) of the
Lanham Act provides a list of factors to consider in determining if

115. Paris Convention, art. 6bis.
116.

See FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS 19 (1997).

117. Id.
118. See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 90 (1968).
119. See MOSTERT, supra note 116, at 423.
120. See Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Caf6, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (1936);
see also Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1959).
121. See Paris Convention, art. 6bis.
122. See BODENHAUSEN, supra note 118, at 90.
123. See MOSTERT, supra note 116, at 432.
124. See id.
125. See id at 428.
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a mark is famous. 126 Other factors, such as sales figures, consumer
surveys or feedback, unsolicited awards, press reports, or other
unsolicited publicity are also relevant in determining whether a
mark is well known. 127 The Court in Maison Prunier v. Prunier's
Restaurant & Caf6, Inc., held that a defendant's deliberate use of a
plaintiff's name is "some evidence at least of plaintiff's wide
repute." 128 In the end, a court balances the probative evidence to
determine whether a plaintiff's mark is well known.
In addition to establishing that a mark is well known, to
prevail in a reputation-without-use case, a plaintiff also needs to
prove that the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff's mark
as a means of capitalizing on the plaintiff's reputation and
consumer goodwill. 129 Mere knowledge by a defendant of a
plaintiff's foreign use of a trademark is insufficient for purposes of
showing bad faith. 130 Where the defendant purposefully adopts a
mark that is substantially similar to the plaintiff's well known
mark, the defendant is attempting to deceive the public into
believing that the defendant is, in some way, connected to or
authorized by the plaintiff. 131 There is no requirement, however,
that the plaintiff and the defendant be in direct competition. 132

126. The factors include:
A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods ...with
which the mark is used; C) jhe duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark; D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used; E) the channels of trade for the goods ... with which the mark is used; F)
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade
used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A-H) (1995).
127. See MOSTERT, supra note 116, at 428-29.
128. Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafd, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529,537 (1936).
129. See id. at 531.
130. See Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The court held that knowledge of a mark's use outside of U.S. commerce does not
preclude good faith adoption and use of the identical mark in the United States prior to
entry of the foreign user into the domestic market. The court did, however, suggest that
where a foreign user's mark is famous in the United States, the case for bad faith is
stronger. See id.
131. See Maison Prunier,288 N.Y.S. at 534.
132. See id. at 533; see also Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335
(1959).
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Thus, where the defendant copies the plaintiff's well known
mark
133
in bad faith, the plaintiff will likely be entitled to relief.
2. Pan American Convention
Article 7 of the Pan American Convention provides that an
owner of a mark protected in one of the treaty nations has the
right to oppose the use of an interfering mark in any other of the
treaty nations. 134 The owner may employ all legal means
necessary to prevent the interfering use of its mark. 135 In the
United States, the owner of a foreign mark can enforce Article 7 in
federal court. 136 The foreign mark must be registered or protected
137
in a treaty nation.
Article 8, the parallel provision to Article 7, allows a plaintiff
to cancel a defendant's interfering mark registered in a treaty
country. 138 Cancellation requires that the defendant possessed
knowledge of the plaintiff's use, or registration of, the mark in a
treaty country. 139 Thus, if Party A (a national of a treaty country)
knows that Party B is using A's mark in another treaty country,
and can show that Party B knew of Party A's prior use or
registration of the mark, then Party A can employ all legal means
140
available in Party B's country to stop Party B's use of the mark.
This differs from the reputation-without-use scenario in that only a
defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's prior use is necessary. There
is no requirement of bad faith. Also, the text of Articles 7 and 8
do not require that use of Party A's mark is necessary within the
141
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.
IV.

EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE DISPUTE

An interesting issue raised by General Cigar is whether
Cubatabaco has standing to bring the lawsuit. 14 2

Cubatabaco

133. See MOSTERT, supra note 116, at 432.
134. See Pan American Convention, art. 7,46 at Stat. 2907.
135. See id.
136. Federal question subject matter jurisdiction covers treaties to which the United
States is a party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
137. See Bacardi Corp. v. Domenich, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940).
138. See Pan American Convention, art. 8,46 at Stat. 2907.
139. See id.

140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants, Affirmative Defenses at 10, para. 9,
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asserts that General Cigar's use of the Cohiba name injured
Cubatabaco's reputation and future earning potential in the
United States. 143 This Comment will not address this issue in
detail. It should be mentioned, however, that Cubatabaco may
have standing based on the PTO's denial of Cubatabaco's
144
application to register the Cohiba name in the United States.
A. Infringement Claim
The first step in the infringement analysis is to determine the
level of protection afforded to the plaintiff's mark. 145 Here,
Cubatabaco asserts that its Cohiba trademark is arbitrary, in that it
As such,
does not suggest the nature of the product. 146
Cubatabaco asserts that it is entitled to "the most protection the
Lanham Act can provide."' 147 The counter argument, however, is
that because "cohiba" is the Taino Indian word for tobacco, 148 the
149
name is merely descriptive, and thus entitled to no protection.
It is likely, however, that the Cohiba name has developed
secondary meaning among the U.S. cigar-smoking public based on
the stature of the Cuban version1 50 and the extensive publicity it
receives. 151 Furthermore, since the Taino dialect is virtually

Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
1997).
143. See Complaint at para. 39.
144. See Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 977 F. Supp. 264, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Court stated that "in order to establish standing to cancel a
trademark registration, all the Lanham Act requires is that the cancellation petitioner
plead and prove facts showing a "real interest in the proceeding..." Id (citing Int'l Order
of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
145. See North Am. Graphics, Inc. v. North Am. Graphics of U.S., Inc. (No. 97 Civ.
3448), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8107 at *6.
146. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 24.
147. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,257 (2d Cir. 1987).
148. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 3. "Cohiba" is the Taino Indians' word for
tobacco. The Taino Indians are an obscure and ancient Cuban tribe. See id.
149. See North Am. Graphics,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8107 at *6-7.
150. See id The name "Cohiba" is so well known among the cigar-smoking public
that, when uttered, Cuban cigars come to mind. See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42.
151. See Declaration of Jessica Heyman para. 3 (taken Nov. 21, 1997), Order to Show
Cause for Preliminary Injunction Hearing and Expedited Discovery, Empresa Cubana Del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1997) [hereinafter
Heyman Declaration]. The Declaration reports that the Cuban Cohiba has been the
subject of over 700 articles in magazines and newspapers of general circulation in the
United States. See id.
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unknown in the United States, the name Cohiba will likely be
deemed arbitrary. Thus, Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark should
receive the highest degree of protection.
The next step in the infringement analysis is to determine
whether there is a likelihood of confusion between Cubatabaco's
and General Cigar's Cohiba cigars. 152 The District Court in153the
Southern District of New York will apply the Polaroidfactors.
First, as to the strength of Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark,
Cubatabaco may argue that the Cuban mark is very well known
among the relevant purchasing public (U.S. cigar smokers).
Cubatabaco advertised extensively throughout the world for over
twenty years and Cohiba Cigars have been the subject of
numerous articles in magazines such as Time, Newsweek, and
CigarAficionado.154 Therefore, Cubatabaco contends that Cohiba
developed tremendous consumer recognition. 155 Cubatabaco
asserts that Culbro/General Cigar deliberately copied its mark,
and that act, in and of itself, constitutes persuasive evidence that
the Cohiba name is associated with substantial recognition and
156
goodwill.
Most experienced cigar smokers, however, probably know
that Cuban cigars are illegal in the United States, that the General
Cigar Cohiba, therefore, is not a Cuban cigar.' 57 Registration of a
trademark (in this case General Cigar's Cohiba registration)
creates a presumption that the trademark is distinctive and should
receive the highest level of protection. 158 Therefore, while
Cubatabaco's Cohiba is arguably an extremely strong mark, the
court may find countervailing factors (i.e., General Cigar's existing
trademark registration) that diminish its strength in the United
States. Thus, the strength of Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark favors

152. See North Am. Graphics,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8107 at *6.
153. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp. 647, 663
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
154. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 24; see also Heyman Declaration at para. 3.
155. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 24.
156. See id.; see also Parrot Jungle, Inc. v. Parrot Jungle, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 266, 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
157. See Interview with Maurice Karroum, Proprietor of Palisades Cigar Co., in Pacific
Palisades, Cal. (Jan. 21, 1999) (Mr. Karroum reported that there are consumers who
inquire as to whether General Cigar's Cohiba is the "real thing," i.e., a Cuban Cohiba).
158. See GeneralCigar, 988 F. Supp. at 663 (citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986)).
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Cubatabaco, but not as much as it would if General Cigar lacked a
United States registration.
Second, the similarity of the marks and the products is
extremely high. The products are both cigars. The names are
identical. The labels on the cigars were very similar in design until
1998, when General Cigar changed the band on its cigar. The
typeface used to spell out "Cohiba" on General Cigar's new label
remains quite similar to the typeface used on Cubatabaco's
label. 159 This factor weighs in Cubatabaco's favor.
Third, General Cigar may assert that because Cuban cigars
cannot be sold in the United States, there is no competitive
proximity between the two products. General Cigar's Cohiba is
sold primarily in the United States, while Cubatabaco's Cohiba is
not, technically, commercially available in the United States.
Cuba's Cohiba cigars, are, however, available in the United States
either through the black market 160 or through persons who travel
to Cuba legally and bring back less than $100.00 of Cuban
cigars. 161 In addition, Cubatabaco asserts, based on the treaty
provisions and § 1126 of the Lanham Act, that its cigars do not
need to be commercially available in the United States to receive
protection against, what it claims, is General Cigar's unauthorized
use of the Cohiba name in the United States. 162 Furthermore,
there is evidence that consumers are not entirely sure that General
Cigar's Cohiba is not associated with the Cuban version. 163 So,
technically, while the products may not be in direct, competitive
proximity, there are situations where Cuban Cohiba cigars are
legally present in the United States and consumer confusion about
the origin of the cigars exists. Nevertheless, this factor does not
159. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 6.
160. See Jason Vest, Psst! Want Cheap Cubans?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14,
1997, at 63.
161. See Dept. of the Treasury-U.S. Customs Service, Cuban Cigar Update (visited
Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.ustreas.gov/ travel/cigars.htm>.
162. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 25; see generally also Vaudable v.
Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1959).
163. See Interview with Maurice Karroum, supra note 157; see also Lois Sportswear
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874 (2d Cir. 1986). In Lois Sportswear,
the court held that the presence of the defendant's designer jeans, which had a similar
stitching pattern to the plaintiff's jeans, in a different market segment than the plaintiff's
jeans, increased the likelihood of consumer confusion. See Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at
874. Here, the fact that Cubatabaco's cigars do, at times, legally arrive in the United
States, leads to confusion between Cubatabaco's Cohiba and General Cigar's Cohiba.
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favor either party to any significant extent.
Fourth, Cubatabaco does not allege any specific instances of
Cigar smokers are generally quite
actual confusion. 164
sophisticated and know that Cuban cigars are both illegal in the
United States and difficult to obtain. In addition, they may be
familiar with the Dominican Cohiba made by General Cigar. On
the other hand, because cigars are currently quite popular and
there are many newcomers to the world of cigars, it is likely that
some consumers may believe that General Cigar's Cohiba is
actually the Cuban version. In fact, at least one cigar proprietor
reports that consumers have asked whether the General Cigar
Cohiba on the shelf is Cuban. 165 Thus, while sophisticated cigar
consumers likely know that a Cohiba on the shelf is not Cuban,
there is a subpopulation of cigar smokers who may be confused or
unclear as to whether the General Cigar Cohiba on the shelf is a
Cuban cigar. Therefore, this Polaroidfactor can be construed in
either party's favor. It will depend on how much evidence of
actual confusion Cubatabaco provides.
Fifth, at present, because of the embargo, Cubatabaco cannot
legally sell their products in the United States. 166 There is
167
sentiment, however, that the embargo should end.
Furthermore, the Cuban Government desires an end to the
embargo 168 and probably desires to enter the United States
market. Thus, according to Lois Sportswear, Cubatabaco's intent
to enter the United States market could create a future likelihood
of confusion. 169
At present, however, the likelihood of
Cubatabaco entering the United States market is remote because
of the embargo. Therefore, this factor favors General Cigar.
Sixth, with regards to bad faith, some issues do exist
surrounding Culbro's adoption of the Cohiba name. In late 1977,
internal meetings at Culbro illustrate its awareness that Cohiba
was the name of a Cuban cigar. 170 In fact, when General Cigar re-

164. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 23-29.
165. See Interview with Maurice Karroum, supra note 157.
166. See Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
167. See G.A. Res. 53/4, supra note 9; see also Cuomo, supra note 41, at 56.
168. See A Conversation with Fidel, supra note 19, at 56.
169. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, at 874 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Kookai S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F. Supp. 605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
170. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp. 647, 651,661
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registered its Cohiba trademark in 1992, the likelihood that Culbro
knew about Cuba's Cohiba was substantial because, by then,
Cuban Cohibas were commercially available in a large number of
countries 171 and substantial publicity surrounded the Cuban
Cohiba. 172 The Second Circuit stated that "'actual or constructive
1 73
knowledge' of the prior user's mark ... may indicate bad faith."'
Furthermore, the court stated that "where such prior use is
accompanied by similarities so strong that it seems plain that
deliberate copying has occurred, we have upheld findings of bad
faith.' 174 Finally, because Culbro had an infinite choice of names
to choose for its cigar, the fact that it chose "Cohiba," raises
suspicions of bad faith. 175 Therefore, this factor weighs in
Cubatabaco's favor.
Seventh, the quality of General Cigar's Cohiba, in terms of
non-Cuban cigars, is considered quite high. They are relatively
high-priced, premium cigars and Cigar Aficionado rates them
highly. 176 Nothing, however, compares to Cuban Cohibas, as they
are considered the world's finest cigar.177 Therefore, this factor
also favors Cubatabaco because its product is often considered
"the best."
Lastly, cigar smokers are generally quite sophisticated.
Hence, it is unlikely that, as a group, they would confuse General
Cigar's product with Cubatabaco's. Cigar smokers know that the
Cuban version is unavailable in the United States. Yet because of
the current explosion in cigar smoking, there are new, relatively
unsophisticated smokers who may not know the difference. At
any rate, this factor likely weighs in General Cigar's favor.

(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
171. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 4.
172. See Heyman Declaration at para. 3.
173. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 587 (2d
Cir. 1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.
1987)).
174. Id.
175. See Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafd, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 531
(1936).
176. See Churchills, CIGAR AFICIONADO, Feb. 1998, at 64 (the magazine rates cigars
based on blind taste tests. The General Cigar Cohiba Churchill received a score of 89 out
of a possible 100).
177. See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42.
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In conclusion, it is likely that consumer confusion exists about
the source of General Cigar's Cohiba. It is also entirely likely that
some cigar consumers believe that General Cigar's Cohiba is the
Cuban version or that Cubatabaco sanctioned General Cigar's use
of the Cohiba name. The products of each party are cigars and
there is strong evidence of bad faith on the part of Culbro/General
Cigar. Therefore, because Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark is strong
and subject to extensive protection, it is definitely possible that
Cubatabaco will prevail on its infringement claim and an
injunction against General Cigar's continued use of the Cohiba
name will issue.
On the other hand, because of the embargo, Cuban Cohibas
are not often present in places where consumers can confuse them
with General Cigar Cohibas. In addition, cigar consumers'
sophistication renders them less likely to confuse General Cigar's
Cohiba with the "real thing." Furthermore, General Cigar has a
registered trademark for the name Cohiba in the United States.
This constitutes prima facie evidence of the trademark's validity
and General Cigar's right to exclusive use of the mark in United
States commerce. 178 Therefore, unless Cubatabaco persuades the
district court that General Cigar's registration was improperly
issued, General Cigar also has a strong chance of prevailing in this
matter.
B. Dilution Claim
The first step in analyzing dilution by blurring is to determine
whether the mark at issue is extremely strong and susceptible to
dilution. 179 For purposes of this element, courts look to the
analogous step in the infringement analysis. 180
Under the
infringement analysis, Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark is arbitrary 181
and consumer recognition of the mark is enormous. Therefore,
Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark is a strong and distinctive mark that is
susceptible to dilution. 182
178. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (a) (1994).
179. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1032-3 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 1033.
181. For a discussion of the infringement analysis, see supra Part IV.A.
182. See Mead Data Control, 875 F.2d at 1034. An arbitrary mark that receives
substantial publicity is capable of dilution. See id.
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The next step in the dilution analysis is to determine whether
defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by
blurring. 183 The question is whether General Cigar's use of the
Cohiba name diminishes the selling power of Cubatabaco's Cohiba
trademark. Judge Sweet, who is the presiding judge in this lawsuit,
developed a six-part test to determine the likelihood of dilution by
184
blurring.
First, there is a strong similarity between the marks, as
discussed under the Polaroid analysis. The names are identical
and the typeface used for the word "Cohiba" on each cigar's label
is similar, if not identical. Because the likelihood of blurring
increases as the two marks become more similar, this factor weighs
in Cubatabaco's favor.
Second, the similarity of the products is unquestionable. Both
parties are in the business of selling cigars. The closer the
185
similarity of the products, the greater the likelihood of blurring.
Therefore, this factor also weighs in Cubatabaco's favor.
Third, because cigar buyers are generally quite sophisticated,
they likely know the difference between a Cuban and a non-Cuban
Cohiba and that a Cuban cigar is not a retail item available in the
United States. Therefore, as a practical matter, there is little
danger that Cubatabaco's Cohiba will lose its desirability or
potential selling power among sophisticated cigar-smoking
consumers.
New, relatively unsophisticated cigar-smoking
consumers, however, do not appreciate the significance of the
Cuban Cohiba. Therefore, in the minds of newer consumers,
Cubatabaco possesses little or no reputation or selling power
susceptible to blurring. Thus, this factor strongly weighs in
General Cigar's favor.
Fourth, a court will consider the predatory intent of the
defendant. Under the bad faith factor of the Polaroid analysis,
Culbro/General Cigar acted in bad faith by adopting the Cohiba
name. An additional consideration relating to predatory intent
stems from an interview of Edgar Cullman, Sr., where he stated
that, were the embargo lifted, he wants his company to "have a
position" with Cuba regarding distribution of Cuban Cohiba cigars

183. See id. at 1032.
184. See id at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring); see also supra Part III.B.
185. See Mead Data Control, 875 F.2d at 1036 (Sweet, J., concurring).
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in the United States. 186 This quote evinces Culbro/General Cigar's
intent to profit from its adoption and registration of the Cohiba
mark. Presumably, in order to act as the United States distributor
of Cuban Cohibas, General Cigar would attempt to establish a
licensing agreement with Cubatabaco. These findings argue
strongly that Culbro/General Cigar's intent was predatory.
Fifth, Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark is world-renowned and very
famous among cigar smokers. 187 It has been mentioned in
hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles within the United
States. 188 There is little doubt that this factor favors Cubatabaco.
Lastly, General Cigar's Cohiba mark is not as highly
renowned as Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark. It receives little press
attention compared to that of its Cuban counterpart, and does not
enjoy the worldwide reputation of Cubatabaco's cigar. 189 In fact,
General Cigar's Cohiba is primarily available in the United States.
It is likely, however, that sophisticated cigar consumers are
familiar with General Cigar's Cohiba, as its existence is publicized
and it is commercially available in the United States. 190 Thus,
although this factor seems to strongly favor Cubatabaco, the
sophistication of the relevant purchasing public diminishes this
factor's impact.
In conclusion, Cubatabaco stands a better chance of
prevailing on its blurring claim as compared to its infringement
claim. Cubatabaco's mark is very famous relative to General
Cigar's.
Cubatabaco's and General Cigar's trademarks and
products are very similar, and in some instances, identical. There
is also evidence that General Cigar acted with predatory intent
regarding its registration of the Cohiba name in the United States.
The strongest factor weighing against Cubatabaco, however, is
consumer sophistication. Therefore, Cubatabaco's blurring claim
appears strong, but General Cigar may successfully utilize its
existing trademark registration, as well as the consumer
sophistication rationale, to defeat Cubatabaco's claim.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Interview with Edgar Cullman, Sr., supra note 34, at 66.
See Suckling, supra note 1, at 42.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 2; see also Heyman Declaration at para. 3.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 2-3; see also Heyman Declaration at para.

4.
190. See Advertisement, CIGAR AFICIONADO, February 1998, at 34-35.
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C. Paris Convention Claim
Cubatabaco contends that the Paris Convention is currently in
force in the United States, based on § 1126 of the Lanham Act. 191
General Cigar disputes Cubatabaco's assertion that the Paris
Convention is currently in force in the United States. 192 The
Second Circuit stated that the Paris Convention is selfexecuting, 193 and as such, requires no special legislation for
implementation of its terms in the United States.
To prevail on its Paris Convention claim, Cubatabaco must
establish that its Cohiba mark is well known within the United
States. 194 In addition, Cubatabaco must also show that Culbro
intentionally copied its mark with designs of capitalizing on its
reputation and consumer goodwill. 195 As discussed in Parts IV.A
and B of this Comment, Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark is well known
among cigar consumers in the United States. 196 The mark is
arbitrary and distinctive, it has existed for approximately thirty
years, and the product it identifies is available throughout the
197
world (except the United States).
In addition, Cubatabaco receives tremendous amounts of
unsolicited publicity in the United States. 198 Furthermore, Culbro
deliberately adopted the Cohiba name in 1978; 199 there is no other
explanation for its use of the Cohiba name other than Culbro's
desire to benefit from the positive association with Cubatabaco's
name and to exact profits from Cubatabaco in the form of
licensing agreements were the embargo terminated. The copying
of the name, alone provides strong evidence that the Cohiba name
191. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 10.
192. See Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants at para. 45, Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1997) [hereinafter
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants].
193. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co. Ltd., 234 F.2d 633,640 (2d Cir. 1956).
194. See MOSTERT, supra note 116, at 432.
195. See Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafd, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 531
(1936). This is precisely what Cubatabaco asserts in its complaint. See Complaint at para.
16.
196. See supra Parts IV.A-B ; see also Heyman Declaration at para. 3.
197. See Inside Cuban Cigars, supra note 22, at 80. In 1994, the top recipients of
exports of Cuban cigars (including Cohibas) were Spain, France, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, the Middle East (as a whole), Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. See id.
198. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 2.
199. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp. 647, 651,661
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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is well known. 200 Therefore, it is clear, not only that Cohiba is a
famous name, but also that Culbro intentionally copied the name
for its own commercial gain. Thus, Cubatabaco will likely prevail
on its claim under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.
D. PanAmerican Convention Claim
General Cigar also disputes Cubatabaco's assertion that the
Pan American Convention is in force in the United States. 20 1 The
United States Supreme Court held that the Pan American
Convention is 2self-executing, and is therefore in force in the
20
United States.
The United States and Cuba are currently parties to the Pan
American Convention. 20 3 Cubatabaco registered the Cohiba mark
in Cuba in 1972.204 Culbro registered the Cohiba name in the
United States in 1978.205 The Pan American Convention allows
Cubatabaco to use all legal means available in the United States to
prevent General Cigar from using the Cohiba name if Cubatabaco
can show that Culbro had knowledge of Cubatabaco's use of the
Cohiba mark prior to 1978.206
Clearly, in 1977, Culbro knew that Cohiba was a brand of
Cuban cigars as evidenced by the internal meetings at Culbro in
late 1977.207
This knowledge provides a basis by which
Cubatabaco can cancel General Cigar's Cohiba trademark in the
United States. The exact interpretation of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Pan American Convention within the United States is unclear, but
if the language is taken literally, it appears that Cubatabaco may
prevail on this claim.

200. See Maison Prunier,288 N.Y.S. at 537.
201. See Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants at para. 49.
202. See Bacardi Corp. v. Domenich, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940).
203. See Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force, 376-77,
(1997).
204. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 4.
205. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Marketing, 988 F. Supp 647, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
206. See Pan American Convention, arts. 7,8,46 Stat. at 2907.
207. See GeneralCigar, 988 F. Supp. at 651,661.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Cuban people are hopeful that someday soon, they will
be able to engage in trade with the United States. Cigars are one
of the most desired Cuban products in the United States; simply
put, they are the best. Cuba's cigar industry, and in particular the
Cohiba brand, is world-famous because of its superior quality. To
secure a future channel of trade for its (Cohiba) cigars, as well to
protect the impeccable reputation that Cohiba enjoys around the
world, Cubatabaco sued two American companies, Culbro and
General Cigar, for allegedly pirating the Cohiba name for
economic benefit. This Comment analyzed several of the many
claims Cubatabaco raised in its lawsuit. 208
In short, Cubatabaco has a strong chance of prevailing on its
treaty claims.
Cubatabaco should successfully establish the
"knowledge" requirement in Article 8 of the Pan American
Convention, as well as the "well known mark" requirement in
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. The issue of whether
Cubatabaco can establish the "intentional copying for commercial
benefit" requirement of Article 6bis and the reputation-withoutuse scenario presents a closer question, but one that Cubatabaco
can most likely satisfy.
To briefly review, in the late 1970s, when Culbro filed an
application to register the Cohiba name in the United States, it
was cognizant of the fame and quality of Cuban Cohibas. Of the
infinite number of possible names to use on its cigar, Culbro chose
Cohiba. This, standing alone, raises great suspicion. In addition,
the comments of Edgar Cullman, Sr. fortify the conclusion that,
where Cohiba is concerned, Culbro's agenda is purely economic.
This evidence most likely satisfies both the Pan American and the
Paris Convention provisions discussed.
Cubatabaco is less likely to prevail on its infringement claim.
While several factors of the likelihood of confusion analysis, such
as the similarity between the marks and the products, the quality
of Cubatabaco's product, and potential findings of bad faith, favor
Cubatabaco, the sophistication of the consumers and the low
possibility that Cubatabaco will "bridge the gap" favor General
Cigar. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, General Cigar

208. See generally Complaint.

1999]

The Cohiba Trademark in the U.S.

owns a United States registration for the Cohiba name. The
presumption of validity of the trademark and its use, established
by registration, may be difficult for Cubatabaco to overcome
regardless of the likelihood of confusion. Therefore, Cubatabaco
will experience difficulty in prevailing on its infringement claim.
Cubatabaco's dilution claim has more merit than its
infringement claim. The fact that the marks and products are very
similar weighs in Cubatabaco's favor, as does the predatory intent
of Culbro/General Cigar. Consumer sophistication is the only
factor that weighs in Culbro/General Cigar's favor. As discussed
in Part IV.B of this Comment, this factor may be quite significant
in the overall analysis. Therefore, while Cubatabaco's claim is not
a "sure thing" by any stretch of the imagination, it has a good
chance of prevailing on the dilution claim.
Cubatabaco will likely prevail on at least one of the claims
discussed in this Comment (not to mention the nine others not
discussed). Cubatabaco should prevail because it spent a great
deal of time and care in developing the Cohiba cigar and its
associated reputation. Cuba takes enormous pride in the quality
of its cigars. It is inconceivable that in 1977, Culbro came up with
the Cohiba name out of thin air. Clearly, some intent existed on
Culbro's part to exact commercial benefits from the name Cohiba,
and that is wrong. Business may be business, but trademark and
unfair competition law provides that pirating a famous name from
another country for economic benefit should not be tolerated. In
conclusion, Cohiba is not just another stogie; it is, in the minds of
many, the world's finest cigar. As such, the name Cohiba, as
originated by Cubatabaco, should be protected in the United
States. 209
Mark D. Nielsen*

209. This case went to settlement on December 16, 1997. At the time of this writing,
there have been no new developments.
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2000; Ph.D. Pharmacology, University of
Washington, 1997; B.S. cum laude Biological Sciences, University of Southern California,
1992.

